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Curiosity is a basic element of our cognition, but its biological function, mechanisms, and neural underpin-
ning remain poorly understood. It is nonetheless a motivator for learning, influential in decision-making,
and crucial for healthy development. One factor limiting our understanding of it is the lack of a widely agreed
upon delineation of what is and is not curiosity. Another factor is the dearth of standardized laboratory tasks
that manipulate curiosity in the lab. Despite these barriers, recent years have seen a major growth of interest
in both the neuroscience and psychology of curiosity. In this Perspective, we advocate for the importance of
the field, provide a selective overview of its current state, and describe tasks that are used to study curiosity
and information-seeking. We propose that, rather than worry about defining curiosity, it is more helpful to
consider the motivations for information-seeking behavior and to study it in its ethological context.Background
Curiosity is such a basic component of our nature that we are
nearly oblivious to its pervasiveness in our lives. Consider,
though, howmuch of our time we spend seeking and consuming
information, whether listening to the news ormusic; browsing the
internet; reading books or magazines; watching television,
movies, and sports; or otherwise engaging in activities not
directly related to eating, reproduction, and basic survival. Our
insatiable demand for information drives a much of the global
economy and, on a micro-scale, motivates learning and drives
patterns of foraging in animals. Its diminution is a symptom of
depression, and its overexpression contributes to distractibility,
a symptom of disorders such as attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD). Curiosity is thought of as the noblest of human
drives but is commonly denigrated as dangerous (as in the
expression ‘‘curiosity killed the cat’’). Despite its link with the
most abstract human thoughts, some rudimentary forms of it
can be observed even in the humble worm C. elegans.
Despite its pervasiveness, we lack even the most basic
integrative theory of the basis, mechanisms, and purpose of cu-
riosity. Nonetheless, as a psychological phenomenon, curios-
ity—and the desire for information more broadly—has attracted
the interest of the biggest names in the history of psychology
(e.g., James, 1913; Pavlov, 1927; Skinner, 1938). Despite this in-
terest, only recently have psychologists and neuroscientists
begun widespread and coordinated efforts to unlock its mys-
teries (e.g., Gottlieb et al., 2013; Gruber et al., 2014; Kang
et al., 2009). This Perspective aims to summarize this recent
research, motivate new interest in the problem, and tentatively
propose a framework for future studies of the neuroscience
and psychology of curiosity.
Definition and Taxonomy of Curiosity
One factor that has hindered the development of a formal study
of curiosity is the lack of a single widely accepted definition of the
term. In particular, many observers think that curiosity is a
special type of the broader category of information-seeking.
But carving out a formal distinction between curiosity and infor-mation-seeking has proven difficult. As a consequence, much
research that is directly relevant to the problem of curiosity
does not use the term curiosity and, instead, focuses on what
are considered to be distinct phenomena. These phenomena
include, for example, play, exploration, reinforcement learning,
latent learning, neophilia, and self-reported desire for informa-
tion (e.g., Deci, 1975; Gruber et al., 2014; Jirout and Klahr,
2012; Kang et al., 2009; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Tolman and
Gleitman, 1949). Conversely, studies that do use the term curios-
ity range quite broadly in topic area. In laboratory studies, the
term curiosity itself is broad enough to encompass both the
desire for answers to trivia questions and the strategic deploy-
ment of gaze in free viewing (Gottlieb et al., 2013).
We consider this diversity of definitions to be both character-
istic of a nascent field and healthy. Here we consider some
classic views with an aim toward helping us think about how to
study curiosity in the future.
Classic Descriptions of Curiosity
Philosopher and psychologist William James called curiosity
‘‘the impulse towards better cognition,’’ meaning that it is the
desire to understand that which you do not (James, 1899). He
noted that, in children, it drives them toward objects of novel,
sensational qualities—that which is ‘‘bright, vivid, startling.’’
This early definition of curiosity, he said, later gives way to a
‘‘higher, more intellectual form’’—an impulse toward more
complete scientific and philosophic knowledge. Psychologist-
educators G. Stanley Hall and Theodate L. Smith pioneered
some of the earliest experimental work on the development of
curiosity by collecting questionnaires and child biographies
from mothers on the development of interest and curiosity (Hall
and Smith, 1903). From these data, they describe children’s pro-
gression through four stages of development, starting with
‘‘passive staring’’ as early as the second week of life through
‘‘curiosity proper’’ at around the fifth month.
The history of studies of animal curiosity is nearly as long as
the history of the study of human curiosity. Ivan Pavlov, for
example, wrote about the spontaneous orienting behavior in
dogs to novel stimuli (which he called the ‘‘what-is-it?’’ reflex)Neuron 88, November 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 449
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exploratory behavior in animals began to fascinate psycholo-
gists, in part because of the challenge of integrating it into strict
behaviorist approaches (e.g., Tolman, 1948). Some behaviorists
counted curiosity as a basic drive, effectively giving up on
providing a direct cause (e.g., Pavlov, 1927). This stratagem
proved useful even as behaviorism declined in popularity. For
example, this view was held by Harry Harlow—the psychologist
best known for demonstrating that infant rhesus monkeys prefer
the company of a soft, surrogatemother over a bare wiremother.
Harlow referred to curiosity as a basic drive in and of itself—a
‘‘manipulatory motive’’—that drives organisms to engage in puz-
zle-solving behavior that involved no tangible reward (e.g., Har-
low et al., 1950, 1956; Harlow and McClearn, 1954).
Psychologist Daniel Berlyne is among the most important fig-
ures in the 20th century study of curiosity. He distinguished be-
tween the types of curiosity most commonly exhibited by human
and non-humans along two dimensions: perceptual versus
epistemic and specific versus diversive (Berlyne, 1954). Percep-
tual curiosity refers to the driving force that motivates organisms
to seek out novel stimuli, which diminishes with continued expo-
sure. It is the primary driver of exploratory behavior in non-hu-
man animals and, potentially, also in human infants as well as
a possible driving force of human adults’ exploration. Opposite
perceptual curiosity was epistemic curiosity, which Berlyne
described as a drive aimed ‘‘not only at obtaining access to infor-
mation-bearing stimulation, capable of dispelling uncertainties
of the moment, but also at acquiring knowledge.’’ He described
epistemic curiosity as applying predominantly to humans, there-
fore distinguishing the curiosity of humans from that of other spe-
cies (Berlyne, 1966).
The second dimension of curiosity that Berlyne described is
informational specificity. Specific curiosity referred to desire for
a particular piece of information, whereas diversive curiosity
referred to a general desire for perceptual or cognitive stimula-
tion (e.g., in the case of boredom). For example, monkeys
robustly exhibit specific curiosity when solving mechanical puz-
zles, even without food or any other extrinsic incentive (e.g., Da-
vis et al., 1950; Harlow et al., 1950; Harlow, 1950). However, rats
exhibit diversive curiosity when, devoid of any explicit task, they
robustly prefer to explore unfamiliar sections of a maze
(e.g., Dember, 1956; Hughes, 1968; Kivy et al., 1956). Both spe-
cific and diversive curiosity were described as species-general
information-seeking behaviors.
Contemporary Views of Curiosity
A common contemporary view of curiosity is that it is a special
form of information-seeking distinguished by the fact that it is
internally motivated (Loewenstein, 1994; Oudeyer and Kaplan,
2007). By this view, curiosity is strictly an intrinsic drive, whereas
information-seeking refers more generally to a drive that can be
either intrinsic or extrinsic. An example of an extrinsic type of
information-seeking is paying a nominal price to know the
outcome of a gamble before choosing it to make a more profit-
able choice. In other words, contexts in which agents seek infor-
mation for immediate strategic reasons are not considered
curiosity in the strict sense. Although this definition is intuitively
appealing (and most consistent with the use of the term curiosity
in everyday speech), it is accompanied by some problems.450 Neuron 88, November 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.For example, it is often difficult for an external observer to
know whether a decision-maker is motivated intrinsically or
extrinsically. Animals and preverbal children, for example,
cannot tell us why they do what they do, and may labor under
biased theories about the structure of their environment or other
unknown cognitive constraints. Consider a child choosing
between a safe door and a risky one (Butler, 1953). If the child
chooses the risky option, should we call her curious or just
risk-seeking? Or consider a rhesus monkey who performs a
color discrimination task to obtain the opportunity to visually
explore its environment. Perhaps the monkey is laboring under
the assumption that the view of the environment offers some
actionable information, and we should put him in the same place
on the curiosity spectrum as the child (whatever that place is). To
make things more complicated, perhaps the monkey has
decided—or even experienced selective pressure—to favor a
policy of information-seeking in most contexts. It would be a
challenging philosophical problem to classify this behavior as
true or ersatz curiosity by the intrinsic definition.
Therefore, for the moment, we favor the rough-and-ready
formulation of curiosity as a drive state for information. Deci-
sion-makers can be thought of as wanting information for several
overlapping reasons just as they want food, water, and other
basic goods. This drive may be internal or external, conscious
or unconscious, slowly evolved, or some mixture of the above.
We hope that future work will provide a solid taxonomy of
different factors that constitute our umbrella term.
Instead of figuring out the taxonomy, we advocate a different
approach. We suggest that it is helpful to think about curiosity
in the context of Tinbergen’s four questions. Named after Dutch
biologist Nikolaas Tinbergen, these questions are designed to
provide four complementary scientific perspectives on any
particular type of behavior (Tinbergen, 1963). These questions,
in turn, offer four vantage points from which we can describe a
behavior or a broad class of behaviors even if its boundaries
are not yet fully delineated. In this spirit, our Perspective will
discuss current work on curiosity as seen through the lens of
Tinbergen’s four questions, here simplified to one word each:
(1) function, (2) evolution, (3) mechanism, and (4) development.
The Function of Curiosity
Although information is intangible, it has real value to any organ-
ism with the capacity to make use of it. The benefits may accrue
immediately or in the future; the delayed benefits require a
learning system. Not surprisingly, then, the most popular theory
about the function of curiosity is to motivate learning. George
Loewenstein described curiosity as ‘‘a cognitive induced depri-
vation that arises from the perception of a gap in knowledge
and understanding’’ (Loewenstein, 1994). Lowenstein’s informa-
tion gap theory holds that curiosity functions like other drive
states, such as hunger, which motivates eating. Building on
this theory, Loewenstein suggests that a small amount of infor-
mation serves as a priming dose that greatly increases curiosity.
Consumption of information is rewarding, but, eventually, when
enough information is consumed, satiation occurs, and informa-
tion serves to reduce further curiosity.
Loewenstein’s idea is supported by a recent study by Kang
et al. (2009) (Figure 1B). They found that curiosity about the
Figure 1. Curiosity and Information-Seeking
(A) Data from Kinney and Kagan (1976). Attention
to auditory stimuli shows an inverted U-shaped
pattern, with infants making the most fixations to
auditory stimuli estimated to be moderately
discrepant from the auditory stimuli for which
infants already possessed mental representations.
(B) Data from Kang et al. (2009). Subjects were
most curious about the answers to trivia questions
for which they were moderately confident about
their answers. This pattern suggests that subjects
exhibited the greatest curiosity for information that
was partially—but not fully—encoded.
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about knowing that answer. Decision-makers were least curious
when they had no clue about the answer and when they were
extremely confident. They were most curious when they had
some idea about the answer but lacked confidence. Under these
circumstances, the compulsion to know the answer was so great
that they were even willing to pay for the information even though
curiosity could have been be sated for free after the session. (The
neural findings of this study are discussed below.)
Kang et al. (2009) also found that curiosity enhances learning,
consistent with the theory that the primary function of curiosity is
to facilitate learning. This idea also motivated O’Keefe and
Nadel’s thinking about the factors that promote spatial learning
in rodents (O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). This idea is also popular
in the education literature (e.g., Day, 1971; Engel, 2011, 2015;
Gray, 2013) and has been for quite some time, as evidenced
by attempts by education researchers to develop scales to
quantify children’s degree of curiosity both generally and in spe-
cific learning materials (e.g., Harty and Beall, 1984; Jirout and
Klahr, 2012; Pelz et al., 2015; Penney and McCann, 1964). One
potential benefit of such research would be to improve educa-
tion. More recently, the role of curiosity in enhancing learning is
gaining adherents in cognitive science (see Gureckis and Mar-
kant, 2012, for a review). The idea is that allowing a learner to
indulge his curiosity allows him to focus his effort on useful infor-
mation that he does not yet possess. Furthermore, there is a
growing body of evidence suggesting that curiosity enables
even infant learners to play an active role in optimizing their
learning experiences (P. Oudeyer, personal communication).
This work suggests that allowing a learner to expose the informa-
tion he requires himself—which would be inaccessible via pas-
sive observation—may further benefit the learner by enhancing
the encoding and retention of the new information.
The Evolution of Curiosity
Information allows for better choices, more efficient searches,
more sophisticated comparisons, and better identification of
conspecifics. Acquiring information, of course, is the primary
evolutionary purpose of the sense organs and has been a major
driver of evolution for hundreds of millions of years. Complex
organisms actively control their sense organs to maximize the
intake of information. For example, we choose our visual fixa-Neuron 88,tions strategically to learn about the
things that are important to us in the
context (Yarbus 1956; Gottlieb, 2012;Gottlieb et al., 2013, 2014). Given its important role, it is not sur-
prising that our visual search is highly efficient. It is nearly optimal
compared with an ‘‘ideal searcher’’ that uses precise statistics of
the visual scene to maximize search efficiency (Najemnik and
Geisler 2005). Moreover, the strong base of information we
have about the visual system makes it an appealing target for
studies of curiosity (Gottlieb et al., 2013, 2014). Just as eye
movements can be highly informative, our overt behaviors,
including choice, can provide evidence for and against
specific theories about how we seek information, which can, in
turn, help us understand the root causes of evolution. In this sec-
tion, we discuss the spectrum of basic information-seeking
behaviors.
Elementary Information-Seeking
Even very simple organisms trade off information for reward.
Although their information-seeking behavior is not typically cate-
gorized as curiosity, the simplicity of their neural systems makes
them ideally suited for studies that may provide its foundation.
For example, C. elegans is a roundworm whose nervous system
contains 302 neurons and that actively forages for food, mostly
bacteria. When placed on a new patch (such as a Petri dish in
a lab), it first explores locally (for about 15 min), then abruptly
adjusts strategies and makes large, directed movements in a
new direction (Calhoun et al., 2014). This search strategy is
more sophisticated and beneficial than simply moving toward
food scents (or guesses about where food may be). Instead, it
provides better long-term payoff because it provides information
as well. It maximizes a conjoint variable that includes both
expected reward and information about the reward. This
behavior, although computationally difficult, is not too difficult
for worms. A small network of three neurons can plausibly imple-
ment it. Other organisms that have simple information-seeking
behavior include crabs (Zeil, 1998), bees (Gould, 1986; Dyer,
1991) ants (Wehner et al., 2002), and moths (Vergassola et al.,
2007). Information gained from such organisms can help us
understand how simple networks can perform information-
seeking.
Information Tradeoff Tasks
In primates (including humans), one convenient way to study
information-seeking is the k-arm bandit task (Gittins and Jones,
1974; Figure 2). In this task, decision-makers are faced with a
series of choices between stochastic reward (Whittle, 1988).November 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 451
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Figure 2. Bandit Task
(A) In a four-arm restless bandit task, subjects choose one of four targets in each trial.
(B) The value associated with each option changes stoichastically in value (uncued) in each trial. Consequently, when the subject has identified the best target,
there is a benefit to occasionally interspersing trials where an alternative is chosen (exploration) into the more common pattern of choosing the known best option
(exploitation). For example, the subject may choose option A (red color) for several trials but would not know that blue (B) will soon overtake A in value without
occasionally exploring other options.
(C) In this task, neurons in the posterior cingulate cortex show higher tonic firing in explore trials than in exploit trials. ITI, inter-trial interval.
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(sampling to improve knowledge and, therefore, future choices)
and exploitation (choosing known best options). Sampling typi-
cally gives a lower immediate payoff but can provide information
that improves choices in the future, leading to greater overall per-
formance. Humans and monkeys can do quite well at this task
(Daw et al., 2006; Pearson et al., 2009). One particular advantage
of such tasks is that they allow for sophisticated formal models of
information tradeoffs. This level of rigor is often absent in con-
ventional curiosity studies (Averbeck, 2015).
Daw et al. (2006) have shown that humans performing a four-
arm bandit task choose options probabilistically based on
expected values of the options (a ‘‘softmax’’ policy). This proba-
bilistic element causes them to occasionally explore other possi-
bilities, leading them to better overall choices. The frontopolar
cortex and intraparietal sulcus are significantly more active dur-
ing exploration, whereas the striatum and ventromedial prefron-
tal cortex (vmPFC) are more active during exploitative choices
(Daw et al., 2006). These are canonical reward areas; therefore,
these results link curiosity to the reward system (a theme to
which we will return). They proposed that the activation of
higher-level prefrontal regions during exploration indicates a
control mechanism overriding the exploitative tendency.
In a similar task, neurons in the posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC) have greater tonic firing rates in exploratory trials than in
exploitative trials (even after controlling for reward expectation;
Pearson et al., 2009; Figure 2). Firing rates also predict adjust-
ments from an exploitative to exploratory strategy and vice
versa. These results highlight the contribution of the PCC, a crit-
ical but mostly mysterious hub of the reward system, in both the
transition to exploration and in its maintenance (Pearson et al.,
2011). The PCC is linked to both reward and regulation of
learning, therefore underscoring the possible link between these
processes and curiosity (Heilbronner and Platt, 2013; Hayden
et al., 2008). PCC responses are also driven by the salience of452 Neuron 88, November 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.an option, a factor that relates directly to its ability to motivate in-
terest rather than reward value per se (Heilbronner et al., 2011).
The precuneus, a region adjacent to and closely interconnected
with the PCC, was also associated with curiosity in one study; it
is enlarged in capuchins that are particularly curious (Phillips
et al., 2012).
Above and beyond the strategic benefit of exploration, we
have a tendency to seek out new and unfamiliar options, which
may offer more information than familiar ones. The bandit task
can be modified to measure this tendency (Wittmann et al.,
2008). In one case, subjects chose between four different images
in each trial. The identity of the images was arbitrary and served
to distinguish the options. The value of each image was stable
but stochastic, so sampling was required to learn its value.
Some images were familiar, others were novel; however, image
novelty had no special meaning in the context of the task. None-
theless, subjects were more likely to choose novel images (that
is, they motivated exploratory choices). This bias toward
choosing novel images was mathematically expressible as a
novelty bonus (Gittins and Jones, 1974). Interestingly, this nov-
elty bonus increased the expected reward for the novel images
(as measured by an increase in reward prediction error [RPE]
signal in the ventral striatum). These results support the idea
that novelty-seeking reflects an injection into choice of motiva-
tion provided by the brain’s reward systems.
Bandit tasks can also be used to measure the effect of stra-
tegic context on information-seeking. For example, if the infor-
mation relates to future events thatmay not happen, then it ought
to be discounted. Therefore, the horizon (the number of trials
available to search the environment before it changes dramati-
cally) matters (Wilson et al., 2014; see also Averbeck, 2015).
Humans can adjust appropriately to changes in horizon. With
longer horizons, subjects were more likely to choose an explor-
atory strategy than an exploitative one. Together, these results
highlight the power and flexibility of bandit tasks as a way of
AB C
Figure 3. Curiosity Tradeoff Task
(A) In the curiosity tradeoff task, subjects choose
between two gambles that vary in informativeness
(cyan versus magenta) and gamble stakes (the size
of the white inset bar). In each trial, two gambles
appear in sequenceonacomputer screen (indicated
by a black rectangle). When both options appear,
subjects shift their gaze toone to select it. Then, after
2.25 s, they receive a juice reward. Following choice
of the informative option, they receive a cue telling
them whether they get the reward (50% chance).
Following choice of the uninformative option, sub-
jects get not valid information.
(B) Two subjects both showed a preference for
informative options (indicated by a left shift of
the psychometric curve) over uninformative ones
despite the fact that this information provided no
strategic benefit.
(C) In this task, OFC does not integrate value
because of information (vertical axis) with value
because of reward size (horizontal axis).
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able way.
Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty Tasks
What about when the drive for information has no clear benefit?
One convenient way to study this is to take advantage of the
preference for immediate information about the outcome of a
risky choice (Kreps and Porteus, 1978; Lieberman et al., 1997;
Luhmann et al., 2008; Prokasy, 1956; Wyckoff, 1952). In a tem-
poral resolution of uncertainty task, monkeys choose between
two gambles with identical probabilities (50/50) and identical
payoffs (a large or a small squirt of juice delayed by 2.25 s)
(Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2009). The only difference
between the two gambles is that one offers immediate informa-
tion about win versus loss (that is, immediate temporal resolution
of uncertainty), whereas, in the other, the information is delayed.
The reward is delayed in both cases, so preference for sooner
reward would not affect choice. Despite the brevity of the delay,
monkeys reliably choose the option with the immediate resolu-
tion of uncertainty (the informative option; Bromberg-Martin
and Hikosaka, 2009, 2011; Blanchard et al., 2015). This prefer-
ence for earlier temporal resolution of uncertainty is not strategic
because the information cannot improve choices. Therefore,
these tasks satisfy a stricter notion of curiosity.
We modified this task to quantify the value of information by
titrating the values of the reward (Blanchard et al., 2015; Figure 3).
In the curiosity tradeoff task, by determining the indifference
point between informative and uninformative options, we found
that the value of information about a reward is about 25% of
the value of the reward itself—surprisingly high. This finding indi-
cates that monkeys choose information even when it has a
measurable cost. In addition, the value of information increases
with the stakes. In other words, monkeys will pay more for infor-
mation about a high-stakes gamble than for information about a
low-stakes gamble. These results are similar to some recent find-
ings observed in pigeons (Stagner and Zentall, 2010). Pigeons
will choose a risky option that provides an average of two pellets
over one that provides an average of three pellets as long as the
one that provides two pellets also provides what they call a
discriminative cue—meaning a cue that reliably predicted
whether a reward would come (see also Gipson et al., 2009).Zentall and Stagner (2011) did make the link between their
risk-seeking pigeons and human gamblers. This link is poten-
tially important. Curiosity is often mooted as an explanation for
risk-seeking behavior (Bromberg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2009).
Rhesus monkeys, for example, are often risk-seeking in labora-
tory tasks (Blanchard and Hayden, 2014; Heilbronner and Hay-
den 2013; Monosov and Hikosaka, 2012; O’Neill and Schultz,
2010; So and Stuphorn, 2012; Strait et al., 2014, 2015). Risky
choices provide information about the status of uncertain stimuli
in the world, so animals may naturally seek such information. We
trained monkeys to perform a gambling task in which both the
location and value of a preferred high-variance option are uncer-
tain. Knowing the location of that option allowed the monkeys to
perform better in the future, but knowing its value was irrelevant
(Hayden et al., 2009). We found that, following choices of the low
variance (and, therefore, non-preferred) option, when it was too
late to change anything, monkeys will spontaneously shift gaze
to its position, suggesting that they want to know information
about it.
These findings demonstrate the power of the desire for tempo-
ral resolution of uncertainty as a motivator for choice and, there-
fore, as a potential tool for the study of information-seeking. This
phenomenon is particularly useful because the information
sought is demonstrably useless, making it a good potential
model for more basic and fundamental (i.e., non-strategic) forms
of information-seeking than the bandit task. It is also, like the
bandit task, one that works well in animals (meaning behavior
is reliable and stable across large numbers of trials), so it has
potential utility in circuit-level studies.
The Neural Mechanisms of Curiosity
Tinbergen’s third question is about the proximate mechanism of
a behavior. The mechanism of any behavior is in device that pro-
duces it—the brain.
As noted above, Kang et al. (2009) used a curiosity induction
task to test Loewenstein’s hypothesis that curiosity reflects an
information gap (Loewenstein, 1994). Human subjects read trivia
questions and rated their feelings of curiosity while undergoing
fMRI (Kang et al., 2009). Brain activity in the caudate nucleus
and inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) was associated with self-reportedNeuron 88, November 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 453
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types of reward, so these results suggest that curiosity elicits an
anticipation of a reward state—consistent with Loewenstein’s
theory (Delgado et al., 2000, 2003, 2008; de Quervain et al.,
2004; Fehr and Camerer, 2007; King-Casas et al., 2005; Rilling
et al., 2002). Puzzlingly, the nucleus accumbens, which is one
of the most reliably activated structures for reward anticipation,
was not activated (Knutson et al., 2001). When the answer was
revealed, activations generally were found in structures associ-
ated with learning and memory, such as the parahippocampal
gyrus and hippocampus. Again, this is a bit puzzling because
classic structures that respond to receipt of reward were not
particularly activated. In any case, the learning effect was partic-
ularly strong on trials on which subjects’ guesses were incor-
rect—the trials on which learning was greatest.
Jepma et al. (2012) showed subjects blurry photoswith ambig-
uous contents that piqued their curiosity. Curiosity activated the
anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula, regions sensitive to
aversive conditions (but to many other things too). Resolution of
curiosity activated striatal reward circuits. Like Kang et al. (2009),
they found that resolution of curiosity activated learning struc-
tures and also drove learning. However, the differences between
the two studies were larger than the similarities. In the Jepma
study, curiosity is a fundamentally aversive state (Jepma et al.,
2012), whereas, in the Kang study it is pleasurable (Kang et al.,
2009). Specifically, curiosity is seen as a lack of something
wanted (information) and, therefore, unpleasant, and this un-
pleasantness motivates information, which will alleviate it.
Gruber et al. (2014) measured brain activity while subjects
answered trivia questions and rated their curiosity for each ques-
tion. They were also shown interleaved photographs of neutral,
unknown faces that acted as a probe for learning. When tested
later, subjects recalled the faces shown in high-curiosity trials
better than faces shown on low-curiosity trials. Therefore, the
curiosity state led to better learning, even for the things people
were not curious about. Curiosity drove activity in both the
midbrain (implying the dopaminergic regions) and nucleus
accumbens. Memory was correlated with midbrain and hippo-
campal activity. These results suggest that, although curiosity
reflects intrinsic motivation, it is mediated by the same mecha-
nisms as extrinsically motivated reward.
Single-unit recordings from the temporal resolution of an un-
certainty task further support this overlap. In this task, dopamine
neuron activity (DA) is enhanced by the prospect of both a
possible reward and early information. Dopamine neurons pro-
vide a key learning and motivation signal that is critical for
many types of reward-related cognition (Redgrave and Gurney,
2006; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010; Schultz and Dickinson,
2000). The phasic dopamine response is thought to serve as a
general reward prediction error—indicating reward or reward
prospects of any type that are greater than expected (Schultz
et al., 1997). Information is not a primary reward (as juice or water
would be in this context) but a more indirect kind of reward. The
fact that dopamine neurons signal both the primary and informa-
tional reward suggests that the dopamine response reflects an
integration of multiple reward components to generate an
abstract reward response. This finding further suggests that
dopamine responses not associated with a reward—such as454 Neuron 88, November 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.surprising and aversive events—may reflect the value that infor-
mation provides (Horvitz, 2000; Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009;
Redgrave and Gurney, 2006).
These results suggest that, to subcortical reward structures,
informational value is treated the same as any other valued
good. To further test this idea, the authors asked whether
midbrain neurons encode information prediction errors (Brom-
berg-Martin and Hikosaka, 2011). Although the positive RPE is
carried by DA neurons, its inverse, the negative RPE, is carried
by neurons in the lateral habenula (LHb). They made use of this
fact in a task in which there was an option to choose a stoch-
astically informative gamble, meaning it would provide (50/50
chance) valid or invalid information about the upcoming reward.
They found that neurons in the LHb encode the unexpected
occurrence of information and the unexpected denial of informa-
tion—just as they do with a basic reward (water and juice).
Where does the domain-general curiosity signal come from? It
has recently been proposed that the dopamine reward signal is
constructed of input signals originating in the orbitofrontal cortex
(OFC), which, in turn, receives input from basic sensory and as-
sociation structures (Ongu¨r and Price, 2000; Schoenbaum et al.,
2011; Takahashi et al., 2011; Rushworth et al., 2011). If OFC is an
input to the evaluation system, then it should carry information
about the reward value of curiosity but may not carry a single
general reward signal. In other words, OFC may serve as a
kind of workshop that represents elements of reward that can
guide choice but not a single domain general value signal. In
the curiosity tradeoff task (see above and Figure 3), OFC neurons
encode both the stakes of the gamble and also the information
value of the options (Blanchard et al., 2015), but it does not inte-
grate them into a single value signal. Therefore, at least within
this one task, curiosity is computed separately from other factors
that influence value and combined at a specific point (or points)
in the pathway between the OFC and the DA nuclei.
The Development of Curiosity
The fourth of Tinbergen’s questions concerns the development
of a behavior. Curiosity has been central to the study of infant
and child attention and learning and a major focus in research
on early education for decades (e.g., Berlyne, 1978; Dember
and Earl, 1957; Kinney and Kagan, 1976; Sokolov, 1963). The
world of infants is full of potential sources for learning, but they
possess limited information-processing resources. Therefore,
infants must solve what is known as the sampling problem: their
attentional mechanisms must select a subset of material from
everything available in their environments to make learning trac-
table. Furthermore, they must sample in a way that ensures that
learning is efficient, which is tricky considering the fact that what
material is most useful changes as the infant gains more
knowledge.
Infants enter the world with some simple, low-level heuristics
for guiding their attention toward certain informative features of
the world. Haith (1980) argued that these organizing principles
for visual behavior are fundamentally stimulus-driven. For
example, an infant’s gaze is pulled toward areas of high contrast,
which is useful for detecting objects and perceiving their shapes
(e.g., Salapatek and Kessen, 1966), and motion onset, which is
useful for detecting animacy (e.g., Aslin and Shea, 1990). Infants
Figure 4. Curiosity and Attention
(A) Example display from Kidd et al. (2012). Each
display featured three unique boxes hiding three
unique objects that revealed themselves one at a
time according to one of 32 sequences of varying
complexity. The sequence continued until the in-
fant looked away for 1 s.
(B) Infant look-away data plotted by complexity
(information content) as estimated by an ideal
observer model over the transitional probabilities.
The U-shaped pattern indicates that infants were
least likely to look away at events with intermediate
information content. The infants’ probability of
looking away was greatest to events of either very
low information content (highly predictable) or very
high information content (highly surprising), consis-
tent with an attentional strategy that aims to main-
tain intermediate rates of information absorption.
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2005; Johnson et al., 1991), which relay both social information
and cues that guide language learning (e.g., Baldwin, 1993).
Although this desire for information is surely intrinsic, whether
or not these low-level mechanisms that guide infants’ early atten-
tional behavior could be explained with curiosity depends on the
chosen definition. If curiosity requires an explicit mental repre-
sentation of the need for new information, these low-level heuris-
tics do not qualify. However, they do by a broader definition,
which sees curiosity as any mechanism that guides an organism
toward new information regardless of mental substrate. Regard-
less of how you classify them, these attentional biases get the
infant started down the road of knowledge acquisition.
Externally driven motivation is not sufficient. Learners must
also adapt to changing needs as they build up and modify their
mental representations of the world. Many early researchers
posited that novelty was the primary stimulus feature of rele-
vance for infants (e.g., Sokolov, 1963). Infants prefer novel stimuli
in many paradigms, such as those used by Fantz (1964), the
high-amplitude sucking procedure (Siqueland and DeLucia,
1969), and the head turn preference procedure (Kemler Nelson
et al., 1995). Novelty preference is also seen in habituation pro-
cedures in which infants’ attention to a recurring stimulus de-
creases with lengthened exposure. Novelty theories, however,
cannot account for infants’ attested familiarity preferences,
such as their affinity for their native languages and familiar faces
(e.g., Bushnell et al., 1989; DeCasper and Spence, 1986).
Later theories sought to unify infants’ novelty and familiarity
preferences by explaining them in terms of infants’ changing
knowledge states. In other words, an infant’s interest in a partic-
ular stimulus was theorized to be determined by that infant’s
particular mental status. For example, as infants attempt to
encode various features of a visual stimulus, the efficiency or
depth of this encoding process determines their subsequent
preferences. Infants were theorized to exhibit a preference for
stimuli that were partially—but not fully—encoded into memory
(e.g., Dember and Earl, 1957; Hunter and Ames, 1988; Kinney
and Kagan, 1976; Roder et al., 2000; Rose et al., 1982; Wagner
and Sakovits, 1986). This idea recalls the fact that we are curious
about things of which we are moderately certain (Kang et al.,
2009).
Among these theories was Kinney and Kagan’s moderate
discrepancy hypothesis, which suggested that infants preferen-tially attend to stimuli that were ‘‘optimally discrepant,’’ meaning
those that were just the right amount of distinguishable from
mental representations the infant already possessed (Kinney
and Kagan, 1976). Under Dember and Earl’s theory of choice/
preference, learners seek stimuli that match their preferred level
of complexity, which increases over time as they build up mental
representations and acquire more knowledge (Dember and Earl,
1957). Similarly, Berlyne (1960) noted that complexity-driven
preferences could represent an optimal strategy for learning.
Such processing-based theories of curiosity predict that learners
will exhibit a U-shaped pattern of preference for stimulus
complexity, where complexity is defined in terms of the learner’s
current set of mental representations. The theories predict that
learners will preferentially select stimuli of an intermediate level
of complexity—material that is neither overly simple (already
encoded intomemory) nor overly complex (toodisparate fromex-
isting representations already encoded into memory).
Recent infant research supports these accounts (e.g., Kidd
et al., 2012, 2014; Figure 4). We showed 7- and 8-month-old
infants visual event sequences of varying complexity, as
measured by an idealized learning model, and measured points
at which infants’ attention drifted (as indicated by looks away
from the display). We found that the infants’ probability of looking
away was greatest to events of either very low information con-
tent (highly predictable) or very high information content (highly
surprising). This attentional strategy holds in multiple types of vi-
sual displays (Kidd et al., 2012), for auditory stimuli (Kidd et al.,
2014), and even within individual infants (Piantadosi et al.,
2014). These results suggest that infants implicitly decide to
direct attention to maintain intermediate rates of information
absorption. This attentional strategy likely prevents them from
wasting cognitive resources on overly predictable or overly
complex events, therefore helping to maximize their learning
potential.
Related findings show that children structure their play in a
way that reduces uncertainty and allows them to discover causal
structures in the world (e.g., Schulz and Bonawitz, 2007). This
work is in line with the earlier theories of Jean Piaget that
asserted that the purpose of curiosity and play was to ‘‘construct
knowledge’’ through interactions with the world (Piaget, 1945). If
curiosity aims to reduce uncertainty in the world, then we would
expect learners to exhibit increased curiosity to stimuli in the
world that they do not understand. In fact, this is a behaviorNeuron 88, November 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 455
Figure 5. Curiosity and Learning
Experimental stimuli from Schulz and Bonawitz (2007). When both levers were
pressed simultaneously, two puppets (a straw pom-pom and a chick) emerged
from the center of the box. In this confounded case, the evidence was not
informative about which of the two levers caused each puppet to rise. Under
the unconfounded conditions, one lever was pressed at a time, making it clear
which lever caused each puppet to rise. During a free play period following the
toy’s demonstration, children played more with the toy when the demon-
strated evidence was confounded.
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such as work by Bonawitz et al., 2012), which demonstrates that
children prefer to play with toys that violate their expectations.
Children also exhibit increased curiosity outside of pedagogical
contexts in the absence of explicitly given explanations (Bona-
witz et al., 2011). In an experiment in which Bonawitz et al.
(2011) gave children a novel toy to explore, either prefaced or
not with partial instructions on how the toy works, children
played for longer and discovered more of the toys’ functions
under the non-pedagogical conditions.
In linewith the idea that the function of curiosity is to reduce un-
certainty, children exhibit increased interest in situations with
high degrees of uncertainty, such as preferentially playing with
toys whose underlying mechanisms are not yet understood.
Perhaps even more impressively, Schulz and Bonawitz (2007)
found that children preferentially engaged with toys that allowed
them to deconfound potential causal variables underlying the
toys’ inner workings. In these experiments, Schulz and Bonawitz
(2007) had children play with toys consisting of boxes and levers.
Under both the confounded and unconfounded conditions, the
researcher would help a child play with a red box with two levers.
Under the confounded condition, the researcher and the child
each pressed downon a lever at the same time, and, in response,
two small puppets (a chick and a pom-pom) popped out of the
top of the red box (Figure 5). The puppets’ location—dead cen-
ter—was not informative about which of the two levers caused
each one to rise. Under the unconfounded conditions, the
researcher andchild took turnspressingdownon their respective
levers one at a time or the researcher demonstrated each lever
independently. Therefore, in both cases, it was clear which lever
controlled each puppet. After this demonstration, the researcher
uncovered a second, yellow box. After the demonstration and
yellow box reveal, children were left alone and instructed to
play in the researcher’s absence for 60 s. During this period, chil-
dren in the confounded condition preferentially explored the
demonstrated red box over the novel yellow one.
The idea that children structure their play in a way that is sen-
sitive to information gain is further bolstered by a recent study by
Cook et al., 2011). They manipulated the ambiguity of various456 Neuron 88, November 4, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.causal variables for a toy box that played music when
certain—but not all—beads were place on top of it. A researcher
initially demonstrated how the box worked by placing a pair of
connected beads on top, thereby making it ambiguous which
of the two beads was causally responsible for the music playing.
Children were effective at both selecting and designing informa-
tive interventions to figure out the underlying causal structure
when it was unclear from the demonstration. When given ambig-
uous evidence, children tested individual beads when possible,
and—even more impressively—when the bead pair was perma-
nently stuck together, children held it so that only one side was
touching the box to isolate the effect of that particular bead on
the box.
This hypothesis-testing behavior is now widely attested in the
developmental psychology literature. Children appear to struc-
ture their play to deconfound variables when causal mecha-
nisms at play in the world are unclear (e.g., Denison et al.,
2013; Gopnik et al., 1999; Gweon et al., 2014; Schulz et al.,
2007; van Schijndel et al., 2015) and also make efficient use
of information that they encounter in the world to learn correct
causal structures (e.g., Gopnik and Schulz, 2007; Gopnik et al.,
2001). These findings are important because they highlight the
fact that children’s curiosity appears specifically well suited to
teaching them about the causal structure of the world. There-
fore, these strategic information-seeking behaviors in young
children are far more sophisticated than the simple attentional
heuristics that characterize early infant attention.
Conclusions
Curiosity has long fascinated laymen and scholars alike but
remains poorly understood as a psychological phenomenon.
We argue that one factor impeding our understanding has
been too much focus on delineating what is and is not curiosity.
Another has been too much emphasis on taxonomy. These
divide-then-conquer approaches are premature because they
do not rely on empirical data. Perhaps the plethora of definitions
and schemes attests more to differences in scholars’ intuitions
than to differences in their data. Therefore, we recommend
that the definition stage should follow a relatively solid character-
ization of curiosity, defined as broadly as possible. For this
reason, we are reluctant to commit to a strict definition now.
This approach has risks, of course. It means that there will be
a variety of studies using similar terms to describe different phe-
nomena, and different terms to describe the same phenomena,
which can be confusing. Nonetheless, we think the benefits of
open-mindedness outweigh the costs.
Broadening the scope of inquiry has several advantages. First,
it allows us to study information-seeking in non-humans,
including monkeys, rats, and even roundworms. Animal tech-
niques allow for a granular view of mechanism, a greater range
of manipulations, and cross-species comparisons. Second, it
allows us to temporarily put aside speculation about decision-
makers’ motivations and focus on other questions. Third, by
refusing to isolate curiosity from other cognitive processes, we
can make bridges with other phenomena, especially reward
and learning. Finally, it lets us take advantage of powerful new
tasks invented in the past decade for studying the cognitive
neuroscience of information-seeking.
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explain the causes of any behavior. This approach already
provides a convenient framework for considering the knowl-
edge we have so far. In the domain of function, it seems clear
that curiosity serves to motivate the acquisition of knowledge
and learning. In the domain of evolution, it seems that curiosity
can tentatively be said to improve performance, yielding
fitness benefits to organisms with it, and is likely to be an
evolved trait. In the domain of mechanisms, it seems that
the drive for information augments internal representations of
value, therefore biasing decision-makers toward informative
options and actions. It also seems that curiosity activates
learning systems in the brain. In the domain of development,
we can infer that curiosity is critical for learning and that it
reflects both external features and internal representations of
own knowledge.
In the future we hope to see answers to some of these ques-
tions:
d In what ways does curiosity resemble other basic drive
states? How does it differ? To what extent is curiosity
fundamentally different from drives like hunger and thirst?
d What is the most useful taxonomy of curiosity? How well
does Berlyne’s categorization hold up?Which factors unite
distinct forms of curiosity?
d How is curiosity controlled? Which factors govern curios-
ity, and how does the brain integrate these factors into
decision-making to produce decisions? To what extent is
curiosity context-dependent?
d To what extent does curiosity in nematodes overlap (if at
all) with curiosity in children? How useful is it to think of
curiosity as being a single construct across a broad range
of taxa?
d Does our continuing curiosity in adulthood serve a purpose
or is it vestigial? Does continued curiosity serve tomaintain
cognitive abilities throughout adulthood?
d What is the link between curiosity and learning?
d Why and how is curiosity affected by diseases like depres-
sion and ADHD? Can sensitive measures of curiosity be
used to predict and measure cognitive decline, senility,
and Alzheimer’s disease?
We can already sketch out rough guesses about how some of
these questions will be answered. For example, we anticipate
that, although useful in the past, Berlyne’s categories will be
replaced with other, differently formulated subtypes and that
these newer ones will be motivated by new neural and develop-
mental data. We suspect that curiosity serves a similar purpose
in adulthood as it does in childhood, albeit, perhaps, in a more
refinedway. Even as adults we need to continue to adjust our un-
derstanding of the world. Finally, we are optimistic that scientists
will eventually uncover a consistent set of principles that charac-
terize curiosity across a wide range of taxa.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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